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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
UNIONAMERICA, INC., a corporation, aka WESTMOR; RAMSHIRE,
INC., a corporation; WILLIAM
R. STEVENSON; PARK CITY RESERVATIONS, INC., a corporation
dba SKYLINE REALTY; HARRY F.
REED and GARY COLE,

Case No. 17359

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS UNIONAMERICA, AKA WESTMOR;
RAMSHIRE, INC,; and
WILLIAM R. STEVENSON

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a dispute between appellant, the listing broker
of a piece of real property sold by respondent Unionamerica,
Inc., and respondent Park City Reservations, Inc., as to the
rights of the respective parties to a real estate commission of
$96,000 heretofore deposited by Unionamerica, Inc. in an
interest bearing escrow account for the benefit of appellant and
Park City Reservations, Inc.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a trial, the court awarded 60% of the deposited
commission (amounting to $57,600 plus interest) to respondent
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Park City Reservations, Inc., and 40% of the deposited commission ($38,400 plus interest) to appellant.

The court also

awarded appellant a judgment against respondent Unionamerica in
the amount of $2,550 plus interest, as the commission due on a
second sale of real property.

The court ruled that appellant

was not entitled to compensatory damages over and above its
share of the real estate commimssions, and ruled that appellant
was not entitled to punitive damages, attorneys' fees or costs,

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents request that the trial court judgment be
affirmed in all respects.

Only Point II, Point III and Point IV

of appellant's brief apply to respondents Unionamerica, Inc,;
Ramshire, Inc.; and Stephenson; and these are the only points
that will be addressed herein.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Transcript of Proceedings contained in the

~co~

on Appeal will be referred to by the letters "Tr." followed by
the transcript page number(s), and exhibits will be
as "Ex." followed by the exhibit number ( s) •

referred~

There is no dispute

that respondent Unionamerica, Inc. and its wholly-owned
subsidiary, respondent Ramshire, Inc. are one and the same for
purposes of this action and they will be referred to together as
"Unionamerica".

Appellant will be referred to also as "HTA":

Hal Taylor will be referred to as "Taylor"; respondent Park
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city Reservations, Inc. dba Skyline Realty will be referred to
as "Skyline" and respondents Stevenson, Reed and Cole will be
referred to by their surnames.
The following statement of facts will briefly discuss
only the facts necessary to supplement, clarify or controvert
those facts contained in appellant's Statement of Facts that
pertain to the claims against Unionamerica and Stevenson.
On February 17, 1977 Taylor and HTA entered into a
written agreement (the Settlement Agreement) settling a prior
lawsuit brought by them against Unionamerica and Greater Park
City Company (GPCC), who is not a party to the present action.
The Settlement Agreement required both Unionamerica and GPCC to
enter into exclusive listing agreements with HTA as to all
Summit County real estate either of them might wish to sell
during a period of five (5) years.

(Trial Court Finding No. 9,

Appendix E)
The Settlement Agreement stated as follows:
On all property listed with Taylor, he will
be required to perform the usual real estate
broker activities and will be entitled to a
commission rate, of six percent (6%), and Taylor
will further agree to a fee-splitting arrangement
giving sixty percent (60%) to the selling broker
and forty percent (40%) to the listing broker.
(Ex. P-2, Appendix A)
Also on February 17, 1977, pursuant to and consistent
with the Settlement Agreement, Unionamerica entered into a written Vacant Property Listing Agreement (the Listing Agreement)
with HTA for the sale of approximately 10.5 acres of property
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(the Village Property) owned by Unionamerica in Park City , Ut ah•
The Listing Agreement was on the stanjard form generally used in
the community and gave HTA the exclusive right to sell the
Village Property in return for a 6% commission to be paid no
matter who might sell the property during the listing period.
(Trial Court Finding No. 10, Appendix E; Ex. P-3, Appendix B.)
On their face, neither the Settlement Agreement nor the
Listing Agreement required the owner to direct inquiries from
prospective buyers to HTA.

(Tr. 177 - 178.)

Throughout dis-

covery and the trial, HTA's counsel referred to prospective
buyers who might direct inquiries about the property to the
owner as "walk-ins" and, for the sake of clarity, appellees will
hereinafter use that term.

Taylor on behalf of HTA, Stevenson

on behalf of Unionamerica, and Ray Johnson (Johnson) on behalf
of GPCC were the individuals who prepared the Settlement Agreement.

Their recollections as to conversations on February 17,

1977 concerning such "walk-in" buyers vary.
Although Taylor testified at trial that the parties
orally agreed that walk-ins to either Unionamerica or GPCC would
be referred to HTA (Tr. 51), his "recollection" did not occur
until well after this action was filed and appeared to be based
on the testimony of GPCC's Johnson (Tr. 142 - 143.)

Taylor

could not specifically recall what was said during the conversations or whether Stevenson actually said he would refer walkins to HTA (Tr. 152 - 154).

In his early pleadings, filed

before he talked to Johnson, Taylor made no mention of such an
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oral agreement.
Although Johnson testified that there was an agreement
to refer walk-ins to HTA, he appeared to be referring to persons
"walking in" as a result of a $5,000 joint advertising campaing
proposed between Unionamerica and HTA (Tr. 202).

Johnson's

recollection on this point was also hazy, and Taylor testified
that the proposed joint advertising campaign was never performed
( Tr • 1 2 4 - 12 5 ) •
Stevenson's recollection of the February 17 conversations concerning walk-ins was quite different.

He testified

that the subject came up only because GPCC did not wish to sell
properties at the time the Settlement Agreement was made.
Taylor wanted to know what would happen if a prospective buyer
approached GPCC with an offer to purchase unlisted properties.
Johnson stated that HTA would still get a commission.

Stevenson

said he did not participate in the discussion because Unionamerica wanted to list its properties immediately and therefore
the discussion did not apply to Unionamerica.

The question of

walk-ins, as defined by appellant's counsel, was not discussed
and never occurred to Stevenson at the time (Tr. 295 -296, 301,
360 - 361).

Since neither the Settlement Agreement nor the Listing
Agreement referred to the subject of walk-ins, and since the
Settlement Agreement expressly provided that someone other than
HTA could become a selling broker entitled to 60% of the
commission, Judge Croft ruled prior to trial that neither

-5-
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agreement contained any express or implied provision requiring
Unionamerica to refer walk-ins to HTA (Judge Croft's Order of
June 4, 1979, Appendix C).

Judge Sawaya adopted Judge Croft's

Order at trial (See Memorandum Decision of Judge Sawaya dated
May 7, 1980, Appendix D).

Although Taylor contended at trial

that he relied on the exclusive right to sell language as
covering the referral of walk-ins (Tr. 136 - 137), evidence of
customary usage of this language in the real estate industry

d~

not support Taylor's interpretation (Tr. 172), and there was no
evidence that Stevenson or Unionamerica could have been aware of
such "customary usage" even if it existed.
At trial, after hearing the testimony of Taylor,
Johnson and Stevenson, and after assessing the credibility of
each, Judge Sawaya found that there was no oral agreement to
refer walk-ins to HTA, and no mutual mistake or fraud that would
have justified reforming the Settlement Agreement or Listing
Agreement (See Memorandum Decision dated May 7, 1980; Appendix
D, Finding of Fact No. 11, Appendix E).

Although HTA contended

that custom and practice in the real estate industry required
Unionamerica to refer walk-ins to the listing broker, Taylor
testified that this case represented the first time he had been
confronted with the issue of whether walk-ins had to be referred
to the listing broker (Tr. 136).
Shortly after the Settlement and Listing Agreements of
February 17, 1977, Taylor, on behalf of HTA, contacted Skyline
and other real estate brokers to seek their assistance in
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selling the Village Property, and offered to give 60% of the
commission to any broker that sold the Village Property (Finding
of Fact No. 12, Appendix E; Tr. 117 - 118).
Around October 1, 1977, Jack Davis (Davis), the eventual purchaser of the Village Property, had a telephone consversation with Robert Volk (Volk), the president of Unionamerica,
concerning the Village Property.

Davis was referred to Volk by

Gordon Luce (Luce), a Unionamerica director who knew of Davis'
interest in purchasing resort properties and knew of the availability of the Village Property.

Davis and Volk agreed to meet

in Park City on October 3 and Volk requested that Stevenson
meet them there also (Deposition of Volk, pp. 18 - 24; Deposition of Davis, pp. 14 - 15; Tr. 323; Findings No. 13 and 14,
Appendix E).
Stevenson called HTA to find out if Taylor could be
present at the meeting with Davis, in case he was needed to
answer questions.

Stevenson was informed that Taylor was in San

Francisco and would not return until later in the week.
Stevenson did not request to be put in touch with Taylor because
he did not know how interested Davis was in the Village Property
and did not want to ask Taylor to return from San Francisco just
on the possibility he might be needed to answer questions.
Stevenson did not ask to speak with Ken Oswald (Oswald), a
salesman in the HTA office acquainted with Stevenson, because he
did not have confidence in Oswald's abilities (Tr. 368 - 370;
Finding No. 17, Appendix E).

-7-
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On October 3, 1977, Stevenson met Volk at the Salt Lake
City airport.

Volk informed Stevenson that Volk would not be

able to meet with Davis, and Volk asked Stevenson to go without
him.

Stevenson then cal led Cole because he knew Cole and knew

Cole worked for Reed at Skyline.

Stevenson had confidence in

Reed's abilities and wanted a broker to be available if needed
(Tr. 325 -

327, 371; Finding No. 18, Appendix E).

Stevenson met with Davis and Davis' wife on October 3
and was asked some questions concerning potential development of
the Village Property which he could not answer.

He then

arranged for Reed and Cole to meet himself and the Davises on
October 4, at which time they visited the Village Property (Tr.
372 -

373; Finding No. 19, Appendix E),
On October 17, 1977 Stevenson, on behalf of

Unionamerica, and Davis both signed an earnest money agreement,
negotiated and prepared by Reed and Cole, for the purchase and
sale of the Village Property (Tr. 344 - 347; Ex. P-9).

Neither

Taylor nor HTA were involved in the negotiations culminating in
this agreement nor, indeed, even met Davis until October 24
(Tr. 78 - 81).

On October 26, 1977 Stevenson and Davis executed

a real estate contract calling for multiple closings (Ex. P-12;
Finding No. 12, Appendix E).
The evidence showed that the sale to Davis was consummated only as the result of the substantial time and effort
devoted by Reed, Cole and Skyline.

Since Davis was new to Park

City, Reed had to sell Davis on the potential of the area for
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real estate development (Tr. 457 - 459).

Reed and Cole also met

with both StevPnson and Davis in California to negotiate the
terms of the sale (Tr. 344 - 347, 411 - 414).

Because the terms

of the real estate contract (Ex. P-12) permitted Davis to
withdraw from the deal if the development that was planned
became unfeasible, Reed and Cole worked exhaustively for several
months after October, 1977 in order to insure that the project
cleared the various hurdles encountered by a major real estate
development, so that Davis would go through with the sale (Tr.
597 - 602).

It was this latter effort that was the most time

consuming and perhaps the most important.
At no time did Stevenson attempt to conceal or
misrepresent the source of the buyer.

The first conversation

between Taylor and Stevenson concerning Davis occurred on
October 19, 1977, at which time Stevenson fully disclosed to
Taylor how Davis learned of the Villaqe Property (Tr. 88).

When

Stevenson first referred Davis to Reed and Cole, it was not for
the purpose of forcing Taylor or HTA to split any commission
(Tr. 329, 379).
Stevenson believed the term "selling broker" was used
in the Settlement Agreement to mean the broker that brought in
an offer from a buyer that was accepted and that resulted in a
closed sale through the efforts of that broker, and believed
that Reed, Cole and Skyline had performed these functions (Tr.
378), and the trial court so found (Finding No. 27, Appendix E).
However at a meeting held on October 24, 1977, Taylor demanded
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to be paid 100% of the $96, 000 commission that resulted from the
sale of tre Village Property (Tr. 90, Ex. P-10).

Taylor testi-

fied he did not recall what he said at that meeting (Tr. 96),
However, Stevenson and Reed were both present and testified that
Taylor indicated that he would not agree to pay 60% of the commission to Skyline as the selling broker because of his personal
animosity toward Cole (Tr. 595 -

596, 610 - 611, 644).

Steven-

son and Reed also testified that at this meeting Taylor orally
agreed that the entire commission could be placed in escrow
until the dispute between HTA and Skyline was resolved, although
he did not sign the real estate agreement containing the escrow
provision (Tr. 354, 472 - 473, 597; Ex. P-11).

A subsequent

letter from HTA's counsel indicated acquiescence in an escrow
agreement (Ex. D-19).
Because of the conflicting claims to the $96,000
commission, and based upon the advice of counsel, Unionamerica
deposited the entire amount into an interest-bearing escrow
account at the time of the first closing in May, 1978 (Tr. 355,
375 -

376, 418).

By order of the district court dated September

5, 1978, the parties were required to maintain this sum in the
interest-bearing account, subject to withdrawal only upon order
of the court (Appendix G).

After judgment in this action, the

district court ordered the release of 40% of the commission
plus interest t o HTA , b ase d Upon the St ipulation of all part~s
dated February 6, 1981.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

The trial court ruled that Unionamerica's deposit of
the commission into an <~scrow account was reasonable under the
circumstances, found that Unionamerica breached no fiduciary or
other duty to HTA, did not award compensatory or punitive damages or attorney's fees, and ruled that each party would bear its
own costs (Finding No. 26, Conclusions of Law No. 8 and No. 9,
Appendix E; Judgment, Appendix F).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
RESPONDENTS UNIONAMERICA, INC. AND STEVENSON <:MED NO
FIDUCIARY DUTY TO APPELLANT, AND OWED NO CONTRACTUAL DUTY,
WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ORAL OR WRITTEN, TO REFER WALK-INS
TO APPELLANT.
A.

RESPONDENT PRINCIPALS OWED NO FIDUCIARY DUTY TO
APPELLANT HTA AS THEIR AGENT.

In point IIA. of its brief, appellant appears to contend that because appellant as agent owed a fiduciary duty to
its principal, Unionamerica, there is also a fiduciary duty owed
by Unionamerica to appellant.

Apopellant cites no authority for

this proposition, probably because there is none.

The cited

portions of Am. Jur. 2d relied upon by appellant do not indicate
that the duty owed by a principal to its agent is a fiduciary
duty.

Instead, they state that the only duties owed by a prin-

cipal to its agent are contractual duties and the implied duty
to act in good faith that is a part of every contract.

See
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also, Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 19?S),
Am. Jur. 2d directly contradicts the very contention
for which appellant cites it.

12 Am. Jur. 2d Brokers

s

100, p,

851 states as follows:
••• in the ordinary transaction there is no trust
and confidence reposed by the broker in the
principal, as there is by the principal in the
broker,
There is practically no case law discussing a claim
that a principal owes a fiduciary duty to its agent, simply
because there is so little merit to such a claim that it is
rarely raised.

However, in Campbell v. Sickels, 197 Va. 298,

89 S.E.2d 14 (1955) a claim similar to HTA's claim here was
rejected.

In that case plaintiff real estate broker and

defu~

dant landowner entered into an exclusive right to sell agreement
which required the payment of a commission to the broker,
regardless of who made the sale.

The agreement also fixed the

terms upon which the owner was willing to sell.

The broker

obtained an offer that was different than the terms fixed in t~
agreement, and the owner not only refused the offer hut also
refused to tell the broker why the offer was not acceptable.

In

response to the broker's claim that the owner acted in bad
faith, analogous to HTA' s claim presently before this court, the
Virginia Supreme Court stated as follows:
The duty of a landowner to a broker is
different from the duty of a broker to a landowner.
The broker occupies a fiduciary relation
to his client and so long as that relation continues he is under a legal obligation, as well as
a high moral duty, to give his principal loyal

-12-
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service and the benefit of his information as to
the propert~ entrusted to him for sale •••
There is no such confidential relation
flowing from the princ1~al to the broker.
A
principal's contractual duty is to compensate
his broker for services rendered in accordance
with his contract of employment, and so long as
the relation of principal and agent exists to
exercise good faith toward him. (89 S.E. 2d at
18 - 19, footnotes deleted, emphasis added.)
The good faith duty referred to by the court meant good
faith in carrying out the terms of the contract, not a good
faith duty separate and apart from the contract.

This is

apparent from the court's ruling that the landowner had no duty
to the broker to modify the terms of sale set forth in her
agreement with the broker, or to accept an offer that did not
meet those terms.
In the case at hand, the only duty of Unionamerica and
Stevenson to HTA was to act in good faith in carrying out the
terms of the Settlement Agreement and the Listing Agreement.

As

will be discussed more fully below, the trial court correctly
ruled that neither of these agreements contained any express or
implied provision regarding walk-ins, nor any oral or written
agreement requiring respondents to refer walk-in buyers to
appellant.
~he question of whether a fiduciary relationship exists

is a question of fact for the trial court
590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978).

Blodgett v. Martsch,

TO accept appellant's position would

mean that the attorney's fiduciary duty to his client creates a
fiduciary duty from the client to his attorney, which is
nonsense.

Unionamerica and Stevenson owed HTA no duty other

-13-
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than contractual duties.

See also, Mann v. American Western

Life Insurance Co., 586 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978).

B.

THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
THAT NEITHER THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT NOR THE LISTING AGREEMENT CONTAINED ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
REQUIREMENT THAT UNIONAMERICA REFER WALK-INS TO
APPELLANT, AND THE FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO ORAL
AGREEMENT BY UNIONAMERICA APART FROM THESE WRITTEN
AGREEMENTS.

1.

No express or implied terms in the written agree-

ments.
At trial, Taylor conceded the obvious fact that neither
the Settlement Agreement nor the Listing Agreement contained
language expressly requiring Unionamerica to refer walk-ins to
HTA (Tr. 177 - 178).

Taylor also conceded that the only

language relied upon as implying this requirement is the
language in the Listing Agreement giving HTA the exclusive right
to sell the Village Property ana providing that the commission
must be paid even if Unionamerica is the procuring cause of t~
sale (Tr. 135 -

136).

In Point II.13. of its brief, HTA argues

that the one who first "finds" the buyer is always the procuring
cause of the sale and that since Unionamerica would be the
finder of any walk-in buyer and therefore the procuring cause of
a sale to any walk-in, it would be required by the Listing
Agreement to refer walk-ins to HTA.
Unionamerica and Stevenson cannot be held liable to pay
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any party any amount other than the amount already paid into
escrow, regardless of the outcome of the E·rocuring cause issue,
Nevertheless, these respondents must point out that appellant
rnischaracterizes Judge Croft's order entered prior to trial
(Appendix C), as well as the law generally in arguing that
Unionamerica impliedly agreed to refer walk-ins to appellant.
Appellant contends that Judge Croft ruled that in order
for Skyline to have been the procuring cause of the sale of the
Village Property, entitled to 60% of the commission as the
selling broker, Skyline had to both "find" the buyer and
"negotiate" the sale.

Appellant further contends that this is

inconsistent with Judge Croft's unequivocal ruling in the same
order that no implied provision of the written agreements
required Unionamerica to refer walk-ins to appellant.
The only inconsistency in Judge Croft's order is
created by appellant's misinterpretation of that order.

Judge

Croft made no determination that a "selling broker" must both
find a buyer and negotiate an agreement in order to become a
procuring cause of a sale.

Even a cursory reading of the order

reveals that Judge Croft's use of the words "find" and
"negotiate" were not intended to create an absolute standard
which a "selling broker" must meet, but were intended only to
indicate in a general sense that the parties to the Settlement
Agreement intended to motivate brokers other than HTA to attempt
to sell the Village Property, by offering these brokers 60% of
the commission.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At no time since this action was filed have any of ~e
respondents ever contended that anyone other than Unionamerica
"found" Jack Davis, the buyer.

If this fact alone barred

Skyline's right to 60% of the commission, Judge Croft would not
have found that " ••• further issues of fact remain to be
determined ••• ".

At trial, Judge Sawaya did not interpret Judge

Croft's order as setting the standard for a "selling broker" n~
was he asked to by appellant.

The Memorandum Decision and

Findings of Fact entered by Judge Sawaya showed that he felt

bound by the binding portions of Judge Croft's order, but not by
any offhand use of the words "find" and "negotiate" (Appendices
D and E).
Implicit in Judge Sawaya's finding that Skyline performed the obligations of a selling broker is the proposition

that the one who negotiates and closes the sale is the procurinc
cause even if someone else "finds" the buyer (Finding No. 27,
Appendix E).

This proposition is supported by the case law.

Ir

cases where more than one broker is eligible to make a sale, if
the broker who "finds" the buyer is not able to negotiate or
close a sale, and another broker is able to negotiate and close
a sale with the same buyer, the latter broker is the procuring
cause of the sale.

Hurley v. Kallof, 2 Ariz. App. 446, 409 P.2<

730 (1966); Reed v. Taylor, 322 P.2d 147 (Wyo. 1958).

Although

these are not exclusive listing cases, they are analogous ~ ili
case at hand.

When the Settlement Agreement and Listing Agree·

ment are construed together, as they must be, HTA' s only exclu·

-16-
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sive right was to be paid 40% of the commission.

Whether HTA

or another broker was entitled to the 60% selling broker's commission depended upon who was the procuring cause of the sale.
Even assuming Davis had been referred to HTA or "found" by HTA,
if another broker negotiated and closed the sale, the other
broker might well be the procuring cause and HTA would not be
entitled to the selling broker's commission.
It is clear from the facts that after Unionamerica
"found" Davis, the negotiation and closing of the sale were performed exclusively through Skyline.

After Davis visited the

Village Property on October 4, 1977, neither Stevenson nor
Unionamerica had any contact with Davis until October 17, 1977
when Reed called Stevenson to discuss the Davis offer which
Unionamerica accepted after negotiating through Reed (Tr. 343 350).

HTA certainly was not involved in finding the buyer or

negotiating or closing the sale, and even its 40% commission was
earned through the efforts of Skyline.
Common sense alone dictates that the minimal involvement of Luce, Volk and Stevenson did not bring about the sale of
a piece of property for $1,600,000 to a man who had never before
been to Park City.

Reed and Cole sold Davis on Park City and

the Village Property, then negotiated the terms of the written
agreements, and, most importantly, made sure that the development
of the property would materialize so that Davis would not exercise his option to withdraw from the sale (Tr. 344 - 347, 411
414, 457 - 459, 597 - 602).

The evidence overwhelmingly sup-
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--ported the finding of fact by the trial court that Skyline performed the obligations of a selling broker, and there is no
basis for disturbing that finding on appeal (Finding No, 27,
Appendix E).

Neither the facts nor the law supported HTA's

theory that Unionamerica was the procuring cause of the sale to
the walk-in buyer, or that it therefore had an implied obligation to refer Davis to HTA.
Paragraph 36(c) of the fact statement in appellant's
brief indicates that under an exclusive right to sell listing,
custom and practice in the real estate industry in the State ~
Utah impliedly obligates the owner to refer walk-ins to the
listing broker.

However, the parties' stipulation at trial

regarc'I ing the contents of the real estate manual rel iec'l upon by
Taylor did not include this obligation in describing an exclusive right to sell listing, and Taylor testified that he had
never before been confronted with the issue of whether an exclusive right to sell listing impliedly obligated the owner to
refer walk-ins to the listing broker (Tr. 136, 172).

Even if

such a custom and practice existed, it was binding only upon
those who knew or should have known of its existence.

Holley v.

Federal American Partners, 507 P,2d 381, 29 Utah 2d 212 (1973),
Pacific Horizon Distributing, Inc. v. Wilson, 439 P, 2d 874, 249
Ore 591 ( 1968).

Testimony at trial indicated that Stevenson was

not a real estate broker or salesman at any relevant time and
that he had been involved in Unionamerica' s real estate transactions for a relatively short time before the events in

-18-
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question (Tr. 274 - 276).

There was no evidence that either

unionamerica or Stevenson knew or could have known of the
alleged custom and practice.
No implied covenant to act in good faith in carrying
out the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Listing Agreement
required Unionamerica to refer walk-ins to HTA.

The duty to act

in good faith does not add to or vary the terms of these agreements.

See, Mann v. American Western Life Insurance Co., supra.

The only commission that was guaranteed to HTA under these
agreements was the 40% listing broker commission.

The only act

by Unionamerica that could have frustrated HTA's right to that
commission was refusal of the Davis offer.

The referral to Sky-

line did not frustrate that right; it led to the sale from which
the 40% commission to HTA flowed.
The Settlement Agreement and the Listing Agreement were
both executed on the same day as a part of the same transaction
and must be construed together.

The Settlement Agreement made

the exclusive right to sell in the Listing Agreement non-exclusive.

The Settlement Agreement was not just an agreement among

brokers to split commissions based upon some form of multiple
listing.

As Judge Croft ruled, it was an agreement between

Unionamerica and HTA to give brokers other than HTA a right to
sell the Village Property.

HTA was not entitled to become the

procuring cause other than by its own efforts.

The referral of

Davis to Skyline did not make Skyline the procuring cause and
did not deprive HTA of the opportunity to become the procuring
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.
cause since there was no way to tell whether the Davis referral
would result in a sale (Tr. 369).

Skyline became the procuri~

cause by its own efforts.
Courts will not construe contracts as containing
implien terms that add to or vary the substantive rights and
responsibilities created by express terms, nor will they find
implied terms which the parties are likely to have stated in
express language had they intended to include those terms at
all.

Fuller Market Basket, Inc. v. Gillingham, 539 P.2d 868, H

Wash. App. 128 (1975); Smith v. Phlegar, 236 P.2d 749, 73 Ariz.
11 (1951); Tippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 280 P.2d 775, 44
Cal. 2d 136 ( 1955); Camino v. Simon, 219 P. 2d 1018, 203 Okla.
234 (1950).

The duty to refer walk-ins is a term that HTA and

Unionamerica would have included expressly, if they had intended
to include it at all.

See, Beasley-Kelso Associates, Inc. v.

Fenney, 228 S.E.2d 620, 30 N.C. App. 708 (1976) in which the
brokerage contract expressly specified that the owner had to
refer walk-ins to the broker, in return for a reduction of the
commission due on a sale to a walk-in, as an incentive to the
owner.

If Unionamerica impliedly agreed to refer walk-ins to

HTA, did HTA impliedly agree to accept a reduced commission on a
sale to a walk-in, as an incentive or consideration for such
referrals?

At best, the Listing Agreement's silence as to walk·

ins is an ambiguity, which under Utah law, must be construed
against HTA as the broker who prepared the agreement.
Kidman, 235 P.2d 510, 120 Utah 443 (1951).

-20-
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Olse~

2.

No Oral Agreement

Since the District Court ruled prior to trial that the
written agreements contained no express or implied provisions
regarding walk-ins, HTA's theory at trial was that these agreements had to be reformed to reflect an oral agreement that the
parties made.

The trial court found no such oral agreement and

it is unclear whether HTA is contesting this finding on appeal.
What is clear is that HTA did not meet its burden of proof on
this issue, which is a heavy burden in light of the statute of
frauds and parole evidence barriers.
Even though Judge Sawaya was bound by Judge Croft's
earlier ruling, the trial court considered much the same evidence on the oral agreement issue as would be considered on the
implied agreement issue, and found appellant's evidence unpersuasive.

This evidence consisted of testimony by Taylor,

Johnson and Stevenson concerning conversations they had during
the preparation of the Settlement Agreement on February 17,
1977.

Naturally, the passage of time impaired the recollections

of all three witnesses; none of them could remember what was
actually said; and there were significant differences in the
testimony of each.

Taylor's memory must be questioned because

of his admission that he did not recall a conversation regarding
walk-ins until he spoke with Johnson long after this action was
filed (Tr. 142 - 143).

If a conversation in which Stevenson and

Johnson agreed to refer walk-ins to Taylor occurred, it is unbelievable that Taylor did not recall this qonversation at the
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time he filed a lawsuit claiming that a duty to refer walk-ins
was owed to HTA.
Johnson's recollection was also questionable, and at
one point he testified that the agreement was to refer walk-ins
who came in as a result of the joint advertising campaign that
was never implemented (Tr. 124 - 125, 202).

Stevenson's testi-

mony made the most sense, in light of the factual context in
which the conversations occurred.

On February 17, 1977, union-

america wanted to list most of its properties while GPCC did not.
The question Taylor had was whether he would receive a commissioi
if GPCC sold one of its unlisted properties to a walkin, and
Johnson answered in the affirmative.

The conversation did not

apply to Unionamerica and dealt with the question of commissions
rather than referrals (Tr. 295 - 296, 301, 360 - 361).
It is the trial court that determines the facts in a
breach of contract case.

Santi v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 442

P.2d 921, 21 Utah 157 (1968).

I t is also the trial court's job

to draw inferences from the facts, and the trial court should
not be reversed unless no reasonable mind could draw the same
inferences.
(Utah 1977).

Centurian Corp. v. Fiberchem, Inc., 562 P.2d 1252
Even in an action seeking the equitable remedy of

reformation, and even where the evidence is conflicting, the
appellate court should defer to the advantaged position of the
trial court hearing the evidence, and should not reverse factual
findings even if it would have decided the matter differently.
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976); Del Porto v.
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495 P.2d 811, 27 Utah 2d. 286 (1972); Corbet v. Corbet,

472 P.2d 430, 24 Utah 2d. 378 (1970).
In the case at hand the oral agreement issue turned on
the credibility of the various witnesses.

It is obvious that

the trial court accepted the testimony of Stevenson, and with
good cause.

An

appellate court is not able to asssess the credi-

bility of witnesses in the way the trial court can and the
trial court's assessments of witness credibility should not be
disturbed on appeal.

Cannon v. Wright, 531 P.2d 1290 (Utah

1975); People's Finance & Thrift Co. of Ogden v. Doman, 497 P.2d
17, 27 Utah 2d. 404 (1972).
Under Utah law, reformation may not be ordered unless
the evidence relied upon is clear and convincing.
Harper, 222 P.2d 571, 118 Utah 415 (1950).

Sine v.

The proof required

is greater than that required by the preponderance of the evidence standard.
(1949).

Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194, 116 Utah 571

Appellant simply did not meet its burden of proof.
Appellant does not improve its position by relying upon

the tort of intentional creation of civil liability under
of Restatement of Torts 2d.

§

87la

In order to establish such a tort,

appellant would first have to establish that Unionamerica and
Stevenson had a duty to refer walk-ins to appellant.

As has

been shown above, appellant cannot establish such a duty under
any express or imnplied provision of the written agreements,
under any oral agreement, or under any theory of fiduciary duty.
Also, it was not the referral by Unionamerica that made Skyline

-23-
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the procuring cause of the sale and entitled i t to the selling
broker's commission,

i t was Skyline's own efforts.

will be discussed in more detail below,

Finally,

u

appellant cannot

establish that Unionamerica acted with any intent to injure
appellant.

POINT I I
RESPONDENTS UNIONAMERICA,

INC.

AND STEVENSON ACTED IN

GOOD FAITH WITH RESPECT TO THE REFERRAL OF JACK DAVIS, AND ACTED
IN GOOD FAITH, WITH APPELLANT'S CONSENT, AND IN RELIANCE UPON
THE ADVICE OF COUNSEL,

IN DEPOSITING THE $96, 000 COMMISSION IN

1~;

INTEREST BEARING ESCROW ACCOUNT PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE
DISPUTE BETWEEN APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT SKYLINE, AND THERE IS
NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

A.

RESPONDENTS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH REGARDING THE
REFERRAL OF JACK DAVIS

Even though Stevenson had no fiduciary or contract~l
duty to do so, he called HTA first when he learned of Davis, the
prospective purchaser of the Village Property.

Taylor was out

of town and since Stevenson did not know i f Taylor would be
needed or whether Davis was really interested in the property,
he did not attempt to contact Taylor further.

Stevenson was

acquainted both with Oswald, an HTA salesman, and Cole, who
worked

for Reed at Skyline.

He contacted Reed and Cole rather

than Oswald because he had more confidence in Reed's abilities.

-24-
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He arranged for Reed and Cole to meet himself and Davis, only
after lerning that Davis had questions he could not answer (Tr.
325 - 327, 368 - 373).

Stevenson never attempted to conceal or misrepresent
how Davis learned of the Village Property and informed Taylor
during their next conversation, on October 19, 1977, that
Unionamerica had made the first contact with Davis.

Stevenson

testified that he could recall no oral agreement on February 17,
1977 to refer walk-ins, and that the question of where walk-ins
would be referred did not occur to him at that time.

He never

acted with the purpose to deprive HTA of any commission and the
question of who would receive the selling broker's commission
did not occur to him when he first contacted Reed and Cole (Tr.
88, 294 - 296, 301, 329, 379).
The foregoing is consistent only with the utmost of
good faith on the part of Stevenson and Unionamerica.

The main

motivation of both Stevenson and Unionamerica was to consummate
a sale of the Village Property on favorable terms.

Although

Stevenson wanted to involve Taylor personally, when Taylor was
not available it was only natural for him to involve someone he
had confidence in, especially since Volk, his superior, had not
been able to meet Davis (Tr. 326).

Even if a referral to Oswald

had resulted in a sale, HTA or Taylor would have been entitled
only to 25% of the selling broker's portion of the commission
(Tr. 193 - 195).

since Stevenson knew that the Settlement

Agreement anticipated the involvement of other brokers, there
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was no reason for him not to call on one of those brokers,
especially since HTA as listing broker would get 40% of the commission in any event if a sale occurred (Tr. 292).

If, as H~

argues, Skyline was HTA's sub-agent, then a referral to Skyline
was the same as a referral to HTA, just as a referral to Oswald
would have been the same as a referral to HTA.

There was no

reason for Stevenson not to fully inform Taylor what had
occurred, since he had no reason to think that he had done
anything wrong.
The evidence amply supports the finding of the trial
court that there was no factual basis for a finding of conspiracy, conversion, wrongful creation of a liability,

brea~cl

a duty to act in good faith, breach of fiduciary duty or intentional infliction of emotional distress (Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, Appendix E).

There is no basis for this

court to disturb the trial court findings on these questions of
fact.
B.

RESPONDENTS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, WITH APPELLANT'S
CONSENT, AND IN RELIANCE UPON THE ADVICE OF COUNSEL
IN DEPOSITING THE $96, 000 COMMISSION IN AN INTEREST
BEARING ESCROW ACCOUNT, AND THERE IS NO BAS IS FOR
AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

Appellant contends that it is entitled to an award of
.
·
· f ica
· nt issue
punitive damages even though it
lost on every s1gn1

before the trial court.

Appellant cites Nash v. Craigco, I~ 1

585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978) for the proposition that punitive
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damages may be awarded even where compensatory damages are not
awarded.

However compensatory damages were not sought in that

case, and the court merely held that punitive damages may be
awarded in an equitable action, if the defendant is held liable
and the circumstances warrant.

If compensatory damages are

sought, punitive damages may not be awarded unless grounds for
compensatory damages are established.

Maw v. Weber Basin Water

Conservancy District, 436 P.2d 230, 20 Utah 2d 195 (1968).

In

the case at hand, appellant established no grounds for either
actual damages or equitable relief, and therefore punitive
damages are precluded.
Even if appellant had established liability on the part
of respondents, this still would not have been an appropriate
case for punitive damages.

No Utah case that respondents are

aware of has ever awarded punitive damages based solely on a
breach of contract.

The courts of many jurisdictions have held

that punitive damages are generally not available in an action
for breach of contract, unless some independent tort is
involved.

See, Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co., 605 P.2d 95,

227 Kan. 45 (1980); Continental National Bank v. Evans, 489 P.2d
15, 107 Ariz. 378 (1971); Waters v. Trenckmann, 503 P.2d 1187
(Wyo. 1972).

Although appellant attempts to characterize some

of its claims against Unionamerica and Stevenson as tort claims,
they are all based on the false premises that respondents had a
contractual duty to refer walk-ins to appellant.
Punitive damages may be awarded only if the conduct of
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the defendant is willful and malicious.

Palombi v.

Builders, 452 P.2d 325, 22 Utah 2d 297 (1%9).

o.

&

c.

Punitive damages

may not be awarded where defendant has actec'l in good faith, even
though his actions were wrongful.

Calhoun v. Universal Credit

Co., 146 P.2d 284, 106 Utah 166 (1944).

Stevenson's good faith

regarding the referral of Davis has been discussed above.

The

claim for punitive damages against Unionamerica is based upon
the actions of Stevenson and upon the good faith deposit of the
commission due on the sale of the Village Property into an
interest bearing escrow account, for the exclusive benefit of
the contesting brokers.
Unionamerica found itself confronted with an interpleader situation, since it made no claim to the commimssion but
was subject to the conflicting claims of HTA and Skyline.

HTA

argues that Unionamerica should have at least paid it the 40%
1 isting broker commimssion.
asking for.

However, this was not what

HTA was

It was asking for for 100% (Tr. 90, Ex. P-10), and

there is no evidence that it would have accepted less, so that
tender of 40% would have been a futile act which Unionamerica
was not required to perform.
(3rd ed., 1972).

See, Williston on Contracts § 1819

Also, there was a real issue at trial as~

whether HTA had done anything to earn the 40% commission, even
from Taylor's testimony (Tr. 124 - 130).

HTA's anticipatory

breach of the Settlement Agreement, by refusing to pay 60% of
the commission to the selling broker, relieved Unionamerica of
any duty to pay a commission until the dispute was resolved.
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~·

Williston on Contracts

1300 et. seq. (3d ed., 1972),

§§

Understandably, Skyline would not consent to the release of the
40% commission to HTA unless the 60% was released to it (Tr. 477
- 478).

Although Unionamerica may have believed the 60%-40%

split was proper, it was in no position to act on that belief
until the dispute was resolved.
Three factors established Unionamerica's good faith
beyond doubt.

First, Taylor orally consented to the escrow

arrangement on October 24, 1977, and his counsel acquiesced in
the arrangement in a subsequent letter (Tr. 354, 472 - 473, 597,
Ex. D-19).

Second, Unionamerica acted upon the advice of coun-

sel in escrowing the entire commission (Tr. 355, 375 - 376,
418).

Third, the district court ratified the escrow arrangement

and extended it indefinitely shortly after this action was filed
(Appendix G).
Unionamerica never converted the money to its own use
and no party has been damaged from loss of the use of the money
because it has continued to earn interest throughout this dispute.

The trial court's factual finding that Unionamerica acted

reasonably should not be disturbed on appeal (Appendix E),
Finally, since spite towards Cole motivated Taylor in this
matter, it is he who has acted maliciously rather than
Unionamerica or Stevenson (Tr. 595 - 596, 610 - 611, 644),
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY AND WITHIN ITS
DISCRETION IN DECIDING NOT TO AWARD COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEEsm
APPELLANT, AND APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEYS'
FEES INCURRED ON THIS APPEAL.
The sole cause for this litigation has been Taylor's
and HTA' s unjustified claim to 100% of the commission due on the
sale of the Village Property.

For HTA to contend it is entitlea

to attorneys' fees based upon a trial court judgment ordering
the very 60%-40% split of the commission which all respondents
offered to HTA years ago is ludicrous.

Even if appellant had

prevailed at trial on some of its breach of contract claims, the
trial court would have been within its discretion to refuse to
award attorneys' fees, despite provisions in the contract
calling for attorneys' fees.

Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606

(Utah 1976).
Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the trial court
did award appellant a commission of $2,550 on a sale of property
from Unionamerica to Davis not related to the Village Property
sale.

However the Settlement Agreement does not provide for

attorneys' fees and no separate listing agreement was made on
this second property.

Attorneys' fees may not be awarded in

Utah except pursuant to contract or statute.
567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977).
1976).

Stubbs v. Hemm~'

Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498 (Utah

No statue applies here.

Again, the trial court's dis·

-30-
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cretion regarding attorneys' fees should not be disturbed on
appeal.
Attorneys' fees on appeal are usually not awarded
unless the position of one party is frivolous.
~·

560 P.2d 706 (Utah 1977).

See, Bates v.

If this is the standard, then

it is respondents that are entitled to attorneys' fees on

appeal, not appellant.

CONCLUSION
Unionamerica and Stevenson owed no fiduciary,
contractual, or other duty to refer Davis to HTA.

Unionamerica

and Stevenson have acted with the utmost of good faith regarding
both the referral of Davis and the deposit of the commimssion
into an interest bearing escrow account.

The trial court's

findings, conclusions and judgment are amply supported by both
the evidence and the law and should not be disturbed on appeal,
The trial court exercised its discretion properly in refusing to
award attorneys' fees.

If any part is entitled to attorneys'

fees on this appeal, it is respondents.
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Respectfully Submitted,
PRINCE, YEATES, & GELDZAHLER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

'?-C/jt:r;"day of April ,

1981, I served two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents
upon Kent. B. Linebaugh, Esq. of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown &
Dunn at 370 East South Temple, Suite 401, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111 and Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. of Martineau, Rooker, Larsen
&

Kimball at 36 South State Street, No. 1800, Salt Lake City,

Utah 84111 by leaving the same at his office with his clerk or
other person in charge thereof.
PRINCE, YEATES, & GELDZAHLER

By:
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•
February 17, 1977

The following sets forth the terms of an agreement between l-I:ll Taylor, William
President of U:ii.onamerica (Westmor), and Ray Johnson, President
of Greater Park City Company, to settle the lawsuit Taylor vs. Greater Park Citv
•
Company, c:t. al.
Stevenson~ice

It is agreed that Unionamerica (lf/estmo~ and Greater Park City Company
will enter into exclusive listing a,,"Teements with Hal Taylor and Associates for the
next five (5) years for all properties located within Summit County which Unionamerica

(Westmor) or Greater Park City Company desire to sell with the exception of the properties actually used for skiliig by Greater Park City Company.
This agreement is voided if Hal Taylor and Associates is sold in whole bj·
Mr. Taylor '2!ld this agreement as it affects ooly Hal Taylor and Associates and
Greater Park City Company is void if Greater Park City Company changes ownership
in whole.
Unionam.erica (Westmor) will immediately enter in an exclusive listing agreement with Hal Taylor and Associates for the 10. 5 acres of land commooly called the
"Village Land" and the approximate 8. 3 acres of land com:mo::i.ly called "Comstock/
Claimjumper II". Greater Park City Compa.riy will immediately enter icto an e.'!:clusiYe
listing agreement 'l'-ith Hal Taylor and Associates for the remaining Snow Country Condominiums. Further, the listing agreement between Unionamerica (Westmor) and
Hal Taylor :J..nd Associates will provide for a splitting of advertising costs up to $5, 000
on a to-be-agreed-upon advertising schedule.
Twenty-Five Thol!sand Eight Hundred Dollars ($25, SOC) will be paid to J:I:il
Taylor and Associates as follows:

c;11t·r l'<irh

Within fifteen (15) days following dismissal of all cl:llms, Unioa:unerica
will pay to Hal Taylor and Associates Twelve Thousand Nine Hundred
Dollars ($12, 900) cash.
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Within filteeu (15) cbys following c:is::::-,issal of all clnirns, Grc:ilc;
Park City Company will either p:i.y a li~e amotU1t or ~;ivc Hal 'J'ayit:
and Associates a note for Twelve Thousand .i\inc Hundred Dollars
($12, 900) all due and p:i.yable within one (1) year plus interest at fr
rate of eight and one-half percent (a. 5:;).
On all property listed with Taylor, he will be required to perform the
usual real estate broker activities and will be entitled to a commission rate, o!
six percent (6%), and Taylor \viil further agree to a fee-splitting arrangement~·":
si>..""ty percent (GO~) to the selling broker and forty percent (40%) to the listing br1£
· This settlement includes a dismissal with prejudice of all claims incluc::
in the above mentioned action and an agreement on the part of all parties to bear:
own costs and e:...-penses.

AGREED AND ACCEPTED:

UNIONAMERICA (\Vestmor)

GREATER PARK CITY

CO~IPANY

HAL TAYLOR AND ASSOCIATES
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Appendix B

J iSiJ

Kent B Linebaugh
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, SROWN & DUNN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
79 South State Streer
4~0 Conrnercial Security Rank Buildina
P. 0. Box 11501
"
Salt Lake City, Uta:1 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7700

; l LED
Ck ....:

.1

::o· ,

DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTR~·~;
COU?lTY OF SU?1l'IT, STATE OF UTAH
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a
Utah corporation, and
HAROLD I./. TAYLO".,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs, )
vs.

O:tDER DENYING !IOTION OF

) DC!"ENDAllTS' SKYLlllE REED AND
) cou: FOR PA!'.TlAL suil!IARY Jll"JG~!ElIT
)

UNIO:IAHETUCA. me. ' a cor- )
poration, aka WESTIIOR;
) Civil No. 5557
RAl'SIIIRE, I:IC. , a corpnra- )
tion; WIT.T.JAM R. sn:vr·:NSON;)
!'ARI: CITY ;~"Sl-:J!VA1' LONS,
)
INC., a cnrporation di>~
)
SKYLINE REALTY; HARRY F.
)
REED; and GARY COLE,
)
)

Defendants. )
~~~~~~~~~~)
0 R D E R

This matter h.winr, come on for hearing pursuant co
tloticc be fore the .ihnve entitlcJ Court on the 2nd <lay o(
April, 1979, Plaintiffs appearing by and through their
counsel of record, Kent B Linebaugh of Jardine. Linebaugh,
Bro•m & Dunn, an<l Defendants Skyline, Reed .ind Cole
appearing by .ind through their counsel of record, Stephen
G. Crockett of Martineau & Maak, and 1)efendants Unionamerica, Ramshire and Stevenson appearing i:iy and chrou:;h
their couns<.!l o( recorJ, Onna.1.J J. Winder o( rrince,
Yeates & Geldzahler, the Court having heard the agruments
of counsel and considered the relevant

memorandu.~

filed in

behalf of Defendants Skyline, Reed and Cole, and being otherwise fully .i<lvise<l in the premioes,
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The Court finds thac che Sectlement Agreecenc and tho
Listing Agreemenc contemplace thac ocher parties noc involved in the lawsuit might find buyers for the

l~stc<l

properties and negotiate a sale therefor, and that neither
Agreement contains any express or implied provision chat
Unionamerica or Ramshire would direct any "walk in buyer"
to Plaintiffs.

Such issues are thus now resolvi.!d for all

future proceedings in this case.
But further issues of fact remain to be determined
with respect to Counts V, VI, IX, X and XI and.
IT IS

HE~.EBY

0!1.D"::RED that the Motion of Oe[endancs

Skyline, Reer.J and Cole Cor P.'.lrtial Summary Ju<lr,menc o[
Dismissal of sair.J Counts be.1nd ·~s hereby denied.
DATED this

~day o~ 1979.

CERTIFICATE OF SER'!lCE
I hereby certify that the foregoing Order was served
this

JJ1± day

of May, 1979 by depositing copies of same

in the United States mail, first class postage pre?aid,
addressed to:
Stephen G. ~rockett
t1artineau & Maak
d
Attorneys for Defendants Skyline. Ree "'
36 So. State. Suite 1800
.
Salt Lake City. Utah
3411•
Donnld J. ~in<ler
Prince Yeates & Gcldzahler
. ~
Attorn~ys for Defendants· Unionamerica.
;ind Stevenson
424 E~<t 5th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
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l1iil l Z. IS~O

IN THE DIS':'RICT COURT Or" THI:: THIRD .JUDICIAL DISTRICT
1:-l AND t"OR SUMMIT COU!'TY, STATE OF UTAH

HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a
Ci:ah corporation, and
1-!AROLD W. TAYLOR,
PL:iintiffs,
vs.
:;~\ i.J~\,-U'-:ERICA, I1:c., 3
or~tilJn, aka ~\EST!-IOR;

corp-

CIVIL NO. 5557

WiSr!I?J:, L)C .. a corporation;
P,\RK CITY R1'SCRVATIOtlS. INC.,
~ corporation. Jb~ S~~LINC
RicAL-;"Y, llARRY F. Rl:J;D; anJ
(;,\;;Y COLE,

De fondants.

The Court is ot the opinion that the record of this case
cJ.nd thi:

~vid~nce::

1.
reul

t]Jtdtl'

2.

1~ot

.5uflro=ts the following findings on the issues

P~1~~

Kcs~rvcltions,

CiLy

Inc.

w~s

a licenseJ

broker clt all times ui.aterial to the issues of i:his case.
llJl Iavl0r A•sociates Jid

~cr[orm

all Sl!rvices and dis-

char~~d

all obli;acions required of it by the Settlement

.:Jr.J the

\'illiag~

3.

The

lisci.nt;.
orJ~r

vai.id and b indinr,
uith all future
4.

Agree~ent

of Judge Croft entered June 4, 1979, is a

nrJ~r

which resolved all issues therein together

prucc~dings

of this case.

That tl1e s.,~tll!ment Agreement was !!!:.£reformed by any

oral a;;reem.;nc of ch" yarties or mutual mistake of the parties.

S.

Thni: i'laini:.i.ff is entitled to the relief demanded in

Count I l l of its Fourth Amended Complaint and is awarded judgmer.t
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HAL TAYLOR, ET AL 1: .
u:llONAJU:RICA, !::T AL

6.

' .... ;[ T\10

ME!IORANDUH DEC:

That the claims of plain ti ifs on all other counts:

their Fourth ,\mt<nc.icc.i Complaint are not 8uppt.lrted by the r.cor: .
the evid.,nce .:inJ

th~

Court finds in favor of the defendants •::

against the plaintiffs.
7.

That t.he real estate con.:1ission now held in escm

gethcr with all '1ccumula.ted interest should be divid•d 407, to:
plaintiffs and 60:' to the defendant Park City Reservations,:::
The Court ·.;uuld request that both counsel for defendoc:
join in prep.:iring and

subrr.ictin~ finding~

of Fac.:c, Concli.:sion:

La\\. and Judgnicnt consi5CL!nt with tht:? foregoing ruli.nz co

the~.

pursu:int to the r;.ile" of the Third Judici;il District Court.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a

)
)

Utah corporation, and
HAROLD W. TAYLOR,

~

Plaintiffs,
vs.
UNIONAMERICA, INC., a corporation, aka WESTMOR; RAMSHIRE,
INC. , a corporation; WILLIA.'! R.
STI:VE:NSON; PARK CITY RESERVATIONS, INC. , a corporation,
dba SKYLWE REALTY; HARRY F.
REED; and GARY COLE,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT

AND cof'lctusfoNs OF LAW
Civil

~lo.

5557

)
)
)
)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~>

The above entitled matter came on for trial without a
jury, on January 14, 1980, before the above entitled Court, the
Honorabre James S. Sawaya, District Court Judge, presiding.
Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel, Kent B. Linebaugh;
defendants Unionamerica, Inc., Ramshire, and William R. Stevenson
were represented by their counsel F. S. Prince, Jr.; and defendants Park City Reservations, dba Skyline Realty, Harry F. Reed,
and Gary Cole were represented by their counsel, Stephen G.
Crockett.
The Court having heard and considered the evidence,
together with the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised
in the premises, hereby makes and enters its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of law as follows:
FWDINGS OF FACT
l.

Plaintiff, Hal Taylor Associates (HTA) is a Utah

corporation and has its principal place of business in SlllllDlit
County, Utah.
2.

Plaintiff Harold W. Taylor (Taylor) is a resident
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of Summit County, State of Utah.

Harold W. Taylor is the sole

owner of Hal Taylor Associates and is a real estate broker
licensed to do business in the State of Utah.
3.

Defendant Unionamerica, Inc. (Unionamerica) is,

foreign corporation qualified to transact business in the State
of Utah, and having its principal place of business in the Stati
of Utah in Summit County.
4.

Defendant Ramshire, Inc. (Ramshire) is a wholli

owned subsidiary of Unionamerica and is a foreign corporation
qualified to transact business in the State of Utah, having iti
principal place of business in the State of Utah in Summit
County.
5.

Defendant Park City Reservations, Inc., dba

Skyline Realty (Skyline) is a Utah corporation, having its prt,·
cipal place of business in SUlll!Uit County, and was a licensed r•
estate broker at all times material to the issues of this cm
6.

Defendant William R. Stevenson (Stevenson) is•

resident of the State of California.

Defendant Stevenson am:

as Vice President of defendant Ramshire durine the period

oft~

material to the allegations contained in plaintiffs' ccmolaint.
7.

Defendant Harry F. Reed (Reed) is a resident o!

and has his principal place of business in Su=it County, Stati
of Utah.

Defendant Reed is the owner of Skyline and at all ti:l

relevant to this action, was a real estate broker licensed to;
business in the State of Utah.
8.

Defendant Gary Cole (Cole) is a resident of anc

has his principal place of business in Summit County, State 01
Utah.

Defendant Cole at all times relevant to this action •• 11

real estate salesman licensed by the State of Utah in the offi•'
of Skyline.
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9.

On February 17, 1977, plaintiffs Hal Taylor and Hal

Taylor Associates enc-red into a written agreement ("the Sec~le
menc Agreement") to settle a lawsuit then pending by them against
Greater Park City Company (GPCC) and defendant Unionamerica.
Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, defendant Unionamerica
agreed to enter into an exclusive listing agreement with HTA for
any property that it might wish co sell over a period of five
years.

The Settlement Agreement provided chat HTA would be re-

quired co perform the usual real estate broker activities and
"(Taylor) will be entitled to a commission race, of six percent,
and Taylor will further agree co a fee splitting arrangement
~iving

sixty percent (601.) co the selling broker and forty per-

cent (40%) co the listing broker."
10.

Also on February 17, 1977, HTA entered into a

Vacant Property Listing Agreement .for the sale of approxi.l!lately
10.5 acres of property (the "Village" property) in Park City,
Utah, owned by defendant Rar:ishire, Inc.
11.

The entire agreement between plaintiffs Hal Taylor

and Hal Taylor Associates and defendants Unionamerica, Inc., and
Ramshire, Inc., is contained in the Settlement Agreement and the
Vacant Property Listing Agreement.

These agreements were not

altered or added co by any oral agreements between the parties,
now was there any fraud on the part of one or more defendants nor
any mutual mistake involved in the formation of these agreements.
12.

None of the parties co the foregoing Agreement

disclosed the terms thereof co Skyline Realty or any of its
officers or agents.

Shortly after entering into the February 17,

1977, Agreement, the plaintiffs contacted Skyline Realty and
requested the assistance of Skyline Realty in selling the prqperty.

Each of the parties understood that should Skyline sell
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the property, it would be entitled to receive sixty percent (60'.:
of the

comm:~ssion

13.

from any such sale.

On or prior to October 1, 1977, Mr. Jack Davis

(Davis), the evencual purchaser of the "Village" property, had

1

telephone conversation with Mr. Robert Volk, the President of
Unionamerica, Inc.
acquaintance.

This conversation was arTanged by a 111Utual

Davis indicated he was interested in purchasing

property in a resort area, to wit, the "Village" property in Pa:i
City, Utah.

Davis and Volk agreed, either in this initial

conversation or in a subsequent one, to meet in Park City, Utah.
so thac Davis could see the property.
14.

On the morning of October 3rd, Volk directed

Stevenson to fly froc Los Angeles to Salt Lake City for the
purpose of meeting him and Jack Davis, and showing Davis the
"Village" property.

Stevenson had previously been informed cha.

there was someone in San Diego expressing interest in the pro·
perty, although he had noc yet heard of the ·Davis name.
15.

Volk was unable to meet in Park City and insmo:·

ed Stevenson to go to Park City to meet Davis.
16.

Davis and his wife went to Park City, Utah, on or

abouc October 3, 1977.

They either talked to or met briefly If.::

Stevenson on the night of October 3rd.
17.

On October 3rd, after being told to

~o co Park

City to meet Davis, Stevenson called Taylor's office co see if'.!
would be available.

He was told that Taylor was out of cown an:

would not be back until later in the week.
18.

After he arTived at the Salt Lake City Ai~orc.

and after trying to contact Taylor, Stevenson called Cole and
asked if he could meet with Cole and Reed at Cole's house in Pt'
City.

He told Cole chat there was a person interested in che
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"Village" land and inquired as to whether Cole and Reed would be
available the next day to meet with Stevenson and the interested
party (Davis) .
19.

Stevenson, Reed, Cole, and Mr. and Mrs. Davis met

on the morning of October 4th at the Eating Establishment in Park
City for breakfast.

After breakfast the five people went in

Reed's car to acquaint the Davis' with the City of Park City in
general and the "Village" property in particular.
20.

Stevenson did not see Jack Davis again between the

time they parted on October 4th and the time the Earnest Money
Agreement was signed on October 17th.
21.

Subsequent to the meeting on October 4th, and at

Davis' invitation, Reed and Cole went to· San Diego and cet with
Davis in the latter's office.

At that time Davis executed the

Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, and delivered to
Reed and Cole the earnest money required by the offer.

Lacer the

same day, Stevenson and Cole, representing Mr. Davis, went to Los
Angeles and presented the offer to Stevenson who accepted on
behalf of Ramshire.
22.

Mr. Davis testified and the Court

10

finds that

Mr. Davis after meeting Reed and Cole decided that he wanted Reed
and Cole to represent his interests in Park City, Utah.
23.

Prior to obtaining the Earnest Honey Receipt and

Offer to Purchase, defendant Reed confirmed with plaintiff Taylor
that Taylor had a listing relating to the property and that
Taylor would be willing to split the commission on any sale in
accordance with the usual custom in the community,

!!!- forty

percent (407.) to the listing broker and sixty percent (607.) to
the selling broker.

At the time Reed disclosed that he had a

possible buyer for the property, Reed did not disclose that the
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~

client had been referred to Skyline by defendant Stevenson,
officer of defendant Ramshire, Inc.
24.

On October 26, 1977, Ramshire, Inc., and Davis

executed the Real Estate Agreement, and Davis paid the 525,000.0:
due at that time, to the escrow agent.
25.

Since the date of the Real Estate Agreement, Davi;

has paid for and obtained conveyance of two of the parcels of
property described in the Real Estate Agreement, and has constructed, or is in the process of constructing, approximately l4.
condominium units.
26.

At the time of the first of the multiple closings

called for in the Real Estate Agreement, Unionamerica, pursuan:
to the provisions of paragraph l3 of the Agreement, deposited::;
$96, 000. 00 in an interest bearing escrow account pending settle·
ment or resolution of the dispute between the brokers.

None of

the defendants have at any time since chat closing had the
,!>enefit of the $96, 000. 00 so

use~:

.~ioname;ica·~-cted - ~

. reasonably in so depositing these funds in an escrow account in
". light of the dispute.

'-=---

27.

Skyline Realty by and through its agents, Reed u.:

Cole, fully performed the obligations required of a selling
broker under the fee splitting agreement reached between plain·
tiffs and Skyline Realty.
28.

The Court finds chat any defense as co the lack~:

capacity by che defendant Park City Reservations, Inc .. to main·
tain chis action should have been pleaded in plaintiffs' answer
co the counterclaim asserted by Park City Reservations Inc.• or,
at the very lease, prior to trial.

Although che plaintiffs iud

knowledge of che facts upon which they based the defense

a5

to

lack of capacity, such defense was not raised until the trial v1J
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almost complete.
29.

During 1979, Unionamerica or one of its subsi·

diaries sold a condominium apartment to Mr. Jack Davis for the
sum of $42,500.00.

The parties negotiated directly and concluded

the sale without assistance of a real estate broker.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
l.

Plaintiffs Hal Taylor and HTA performed all ser-

vices and discharged all obligations required of them by tha Settlement Agreement and the Vacant Property Listing Agreement.
2.

The Settlement Agreement and the Vacant Property

Listing Agreement were not altered, added to or modified by oral
agreement of the parties, nor will these agreements be reformed
on the grounds of mutual mistake or fraud.
3.

Park City Reservations, Inc., was a licensed real

estate broker at all times material to the issues of this case.
4.

The Settlement Agreement and the Vacant Property

Listing Agreement contemplate that, in addition to HTA, other
brokers might find buyers for the listed properties and negotiate
sales therefore.

Neither agreement contains any express or im·

plied provisions that Unionamerica or Ramshire would direct to
HTA persons making inquiries about the listed properties.
5.

Unionamerica acted reasonably in paying the

$96,000.00 commission into an interest bearing escrow account
pending settlement or resolution of the dispute between the
brokers, and Unionamerica's failure to pay HTA strictly in accordance with the terms of the listing agreement is excused.
6.

HTA is entitled to receive forty percent (40%) of

the $96,000,00 held in the escrow account, together with the
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interest thereon accrued, and Park City Reservations, Inc., is
entitled ~o receive the remaining sixty percent (507.) of the
$96, 000. 00 held in such account, together with interest acct\led
thereon.
7.

HTA is entitled to judgment against Unionameri'a

and Ramshire in the amount of six percent (6'7.) of $42 ,500.00, or
$2,550.00, together with interest thereon at the rate of six
percent (67.) per annum from the date of sale of the condominiu:
apartment to Jack Davis to the date of judgment, and together
with interest at the rate of eight percent (87.) per annlll!l froo
the date of judgment until paid.
8.

The Court finds there is no factual basis for a

finding of a conspiracy. conversion, wrongful creation of a lia·
bility, breach of a duty to act in good faith,

~reach

of a

fiduciary duty. or intentional infliction of mental distress, u:
the Court concludes that none of the foregoing torts occurred i,.
this case.
9.

The Court having concluded that defendants were

not guilty of tortious acts a~ainst the plaintiffs, and chat n~-'
of the parties breached the applicable contracts. hereby con·
eludes there is no basis for plaintiff's claim for punitive
damages.
lO.

By virtue of plaintiffs' failure to timely raise

the defense of lack of capacity to maintain this action, th•
Court finds that any such defense was waived by the plaintiffs.
The Court further finds that any such defense must fail because
at all times pertinent to this action the defendant Harry F.

11

R'

was a broker licensed by the State of Utah and was operating oi
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behalf of Park City Reservations, Inc., dba Skyline Realty.

MADE AND ENTERED this - - day of - - - - - · 1980.
BY TiiE COURT:

James

s.

Sawaya, Judge
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tu THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF trrAH
TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a
Utah corporation, and
HAROLD W. TAYLOR,

HAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
UNIONAMERICA, INC., a corporation, aka WESTMOR; RA.~SHIRE,
INC., a corporation; WILLIAM R.
STEVENSON; PARl< CITY RESERVATIONS, INC., a corporation,
dba Sk'YI.INE REALTY; HARRY F.
REED; and GARY COU:,

_____________
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
))

J U D G ME N T

Civil No. 5557

The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial,
without a jury, on January 14, 1980, before the Honorable James
S. Sawaya, District Court Judge:

Plaintiffs were represented by

their counsel, Kent B. Linebaugh; defendants Unionamerica, Inc.,
Ramshire, and William R. Stevenson were represented by their
counsel, F. S. Prince, Jr.; and defendants Park City Reservations, Inc., dba Skyline Realty, Harry F. Reed and Gary Cole were
represented by their counsel, Stephen G. Crockett.
The Court having considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel, and having entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
l.

That plaintiff Hal Taylor Associates have and re-

cover from defendant Unionamerica, Inc., the sum of $96,000.00
together with the interest that has accrued thereon in the escrow
account into which said sum has been placed.
2.

That defendant Park City Reservations, Inc., dba

Skyline Realty, have and recover from plaintiff Hal Taylor
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Associates the sum of $57,600.00, together with the interest
thereon that has accrued i

1

the escrow account i·•to which the

$96,000.00 has been placed.

3.

The foregoing Judgment shall be satisfied by

distributions from the escrow account to the parties as follows:
(a)

Hal Taylor Associates and Harold W. Taylor

shall receive forty percent (407.) of the $96,000.00
deposited by Unionamerica and/or Ramshire, Inc., and t
addition any interest that has accrued on the forty
percent (407.) to be distributed; and
(b)

Park City Reservations, Inc., dba Skyline

Realty shall receive the remaining sixty percent (60',)
of the $96, 000. 00 deposited by Unionamerica and/or
Rams hire, Inc., and in addition any interest that has
accrued on the sixty percent (607.) to be distributed.
4.

That Swmnit County Title Company, the escrow ageo:

is hereby ordered to make such distributions from the escrow
account upon receipt of this Judgment.

5.

That plaintiffs have and recover from defendant,,
~

o?•

Unionamerica the sum of $2, 550. 00 together with interest thereoo
f rom

J ci.-,

•

l .',

' "1

-.<:r
11

1

a total judgment of $

')_ [

7 'ii'• ~~

rate of eight percent (81.) per annum.
6.

;-v~.

i.·n the amount of $

r<J

-' , making

to bear interest at the

,a/ 1 ~3

J dj ·

That the parties shall bear their own costs in

this matter.

MADE AND ENTERED this - - day of

-----

'1980

BY THE COURT:

James S. Sawaya, Judge
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Kent B Linebaugh
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
400 Commercial Security Bank Building
79 South State Street
P. 0. Box 11503
Salt Lake City, UT
84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7700
DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD W. TAYLOR, dba
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

UNIONAHERICA, INC. , a cor- )
poration, aka WESTMOR;
)
RAMSHIRE, INC. , a corpora- )
tion; WILLIAM R. STEVENSON;)
PARK CITY RESERVATIONS,
)
INC., a corporation, dba
)
SKYLINE REALTY; HARRY F.
)
REED; and GARY COLE,
)

ORDER RE:

MOTIONS OF
UNIONAMERICA,
RAMSHIRE AND STEVENSON, TO
DISMISS AND IN THE NATURE
OF INTERPLEADER; AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DEFENDA..~TS,

Civil No. 5557

)
)
Defendants.
~~~~~~~~~~~~-)

ORDER
This matter came on for hearing on the 5th day
of September, 1978, before the above-entitled court, the
Honorable DEAN E. CONDER presiding, pursuant to written
notices with respect to the above-designated motions, plaintiff appearing by and through his coun.sel of record, Kent B
Linebaugh, defendants, Unionamerica, Ramshire and Stevenson,
appearing by and through their counsel of record, Donald J.
Winder, and defendants, Skyline, Reed and Cole, appearing

-

by and through their counsel of record, Stephen G. Crockett,
the court having heard the arguments of counsel,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
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follows:

1.

That the Motion of defendants, Unionamerica,:

Rams hire and Stevenson, to dismiss be and hereby is denied ;
without prejudice to bringing such motion again in response

l

to subsequent pleadings.

I

2.

I

That the Motion of defendants, Unionamerica

i
'.

Ramshire and Stevenson, in the nature of an interpleader
be and hereby is denied, and the parties are ordered
to cause the $96, 000. 00 commission to be maintained in an
interest-bearing account subject to withdrawal only on the
order of the court.
3.

That plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment be and hereby is denied without prejudice to
bringing such motion again subsequent to additional pleadings being filed herein.
4.

That plaintiff's oral motion for leave to

file a Second Amended Complaint be and hereby is granted,
which Complaint shall be served upon opposing counsel and
mailed for filing herein on or before September 20, 1978.
5.

That on or before September 20, 1978, plain·

tiff's counsel shall serve and mail for filing herein a
Statement of Points and Authorities in support of plaintiff's contention that punitive damages are recoverable
for breaches of contract as averred in plaintiff's Second
Amended Complaint.
Dated as of the 5th day of September, 1978.

~~~~~..-~~~~~~----De an E. Conder
District Court Judge
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